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Abstract 
 
A long-standing challenge in the Information Systems discipline is the development of 
a theoretical account of how IT alignment is achieved, sustained, and generates positive 
effects.  In this paper, we focus on a key piece of that problem: the role of governance.  It is 
commonly agreed that governance – the leadership, structure, and decision-making processes 
instituted to ensure that IS projects generate value while minimising risk – plays an important 
role in achieving and sustaining IT alignment, but there has been little theoretical work on 
how it may do so.  Without such theoretical development, it is difficult to justify the linkages 
between IT governance, alignment, and performance, and explain how these links play out in 
practice.  We seek to contribute to the IT alignment and IT governance literatures by 
providing an institutional theory account of how governance – and changes in governance 
over time – affect the achievement and sustainment of alignment in a complex IS project, and 
thereby affect the project’s performance outcomes.     
  
Keywords:  Information systems projects, complexity, institutional theory, governance, 
alignment, performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
Accepted pre-print version of: 
Burton-Jones, A., Gilchrist, A., Green, P., and Smidt, M. “An Institutional Theory 
Account of How Governance Affects Alignment and Performance Outcomes in a 
Complex IS Project,” Proceedings of the JAIS [Journal of the Association for 
Information Systems] Theory Development Workshop, Dublin Ireland, Dec 11 
2016, pp. 1-35.
2 
 
1.  Introduction  
The topic of Business/IT alignment (hereafter, ‘alignment’) has long been central to 
the IS discipline, with hundreds of studies over several decades.  Although that work has 
generated many valuable insights, alignment researchers argue that we need to go beyond the 
predominant factor-based view – examining what alignment is, what factors influence it, and 
what factors moderate its impact on performance – to a more longitudinal, process view – 
examining how to achieve alignment, how to sustain it, and how performance is derived from 
it (Chan and Reich 2007; Vessey and Ward 2013).  The hope is that by examining the 
alignment process more closely, we can generate more useful insights for practice (Langley et 
al. 2013).  This is important given the challenges practitioners still face in achieving and 
sustaining it (Luftman and Derksen 2012; Wagner 2014).   
In addition to focusing on alignment as a process, Chan and Reich (2007) call for 
researchers to develop richer theories of alignment.  Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to 
contribute to the alignment literature by providing a theoretical account of the alignment 
process.  To scope the work, we focus on one part of the process, IT governance, and one 
context, complex IS projects.   
IT governance can be viewed in various ways but a common definition is that it 
involves the leadership, structure, and decision-making processes instituted to ensure that IS 
projects generate value while minimising risk (Bowen et al. 2007; ITGI 2007).  Given its role 
in ensuring positive outcomes, it is natural to expect good governance to play a key role in 
achieving and sustaining alignment, but there has been little research on how it may do so.1  
We seek to contribute such insights in the context of complex IS projects because these 
projects have major implications for improving or impairing alignment (Barley 1986; Nelson 
2005).  Compared to simple projects, complex projects have more stakeholders, uncertainty, 
                                        
1 For instance, when we conducted a search on the Scopus database, we found 99 articles for the keywords “IT 
alignment” but we found only 18 articles when we adjusted the query to: governance and “IT alignment.”   
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and parts (e.g., sub-projects) (DOD 2012).  The difficulty of achieving alignment and the 
consequences of misalignment are magnified in such cases, so achieving effective governance 
is especially critical and yet challenging (Koh and Crawford 2012).   
To provide a theoretical account of how governance, alignment, and performance 
relate in the context of a complex IS project, we turn to institutional theory.2   While other 
theories could also be useful (e.g., complexity theory, Vessey and Ward 2013), the literature 
suggests that institutional theory could be particularly useful.  For instance, in project 
management (Floricel et al. 2014), and the management field of which it is part (Westphal 
and Zajac 2013), researchers have called for greater use of social theories such as institutional 
theory to explain governance processes, rather than limit themselves to rational economic 
004)</DisplayText><record><rec-number(Badewi and Shehab 2016).  Likewise, in IS, Jacobson 
(2009) singled out institutional theory for its potential to explain how governance occurs, 
changes, and affects performance, and others have called for alignment researchers to use 
institutional theory too (Dhaliwal et al. 2011).  Motivated by such papers, we set out to 
provide what we believe is one of the first institutional theory accounts of the links between 
governance, alignment, and performance in a complex IS project context.  We believe the 
theory offers several novel and empirically testable insights as well as a fresh alternative to 
more economically-rational perspectives in the field.         
 The paper is structured as follows.  We begin by defining our key concepts 
(governance, alignment, and performance), describe the context we are focusing on (complex 
IS projects), and provide a brief overview of institutional theory.  We then apply institutional 
theory to provide our theoretical account of how governance, alignment, and performance 
relate in a complex IS project context.  Finally, we discuss the possible contributions and 
implications of the proposed theory, acknowledge several limitations, and conclude the paper.  
                                        
2 We use ‘institutional theory’ broadly to refer to theories in the institutional tradition, rather than distinguishing 
between variants within the tradition, e.g., between institutional theory, neoinstitutional theory, institutional 
logics, and institutional work.  See Thornton et al. (2012) for a similar holistic perspective.   
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2.  Background 
 In this section, we provide relevant background on our concepts, context, and theory.  
2.1  Key Concepts 
 As noted earlier, we define governance in a project as the leadership, structure, and 
decision-making processes instituted to ensure that IS projects generate value while 
minimising risk (Bowen et al. 2007; ITGI 2007).  For clarity, we note how governance differs 
from related concepts such as project management and project control.  All three concepts 
have been defined in various ways (Samset and Volden 2016; Turner 2006), but a common 
definition of project management is “the application of processes, methods, knowledge, skills 
and experience to achieve the project objectives” (https://www.apm.org.uk/WhatIsPM) and a 
common definition of project control is  “any attempt to align individual behaviors with 
organizational objectives” (Wiener et al. 2016 p. A1).  Clearly, all three concepts 
(governance, management, and control) focus on actors’ efforts to ensure the achievement of 
project objectives.  We can distinguish the concepts, however, by the actors involved, scope 
of the activities, and the underlying paradigm.   
 In relation to the actors involved, actors in large organizations who are ascribed the 
role of “project manager” are typically employed at a lower level of the organizational 
hierarchy than, and report to, the actors ascribed the role of “governing” the project (typically 
in a group such as a board or steering committee).  Thus, it is often said that project managers 
operate within the existing organizational governance structure (ITGI 2003 p. 10; Turner 
2006; Van Grembergen and De Haes 2010 p. 1; Weill and Ross 2004 p. 2).   
 In relation to the scope of the activities, project governance and project management 
are both broader concepts than project control.  The classical definition of management is that 
management has four functions (planning, leading, organizing, and controlling) (Tsoukas 
1994).  Thus, controlling is just a subset of management.  In other words, we view project 
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governance as different to project management and project control given the higher level at 
which governance takes place both in terms of those involved and the decisions made.  
 In relation to the paradigm underlying the concept, project management is a broad 
concept that can be studied from many theoretical paradigms; in fact, many argue that the 
underlying paradigm is still in development (Floricel et al. 2014; Soderlund 2004).  On the 
other hand, the literature on project control has tended to operate within one single paradigm 
– an economically-rational agency-theory perspective (e.g., Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; 
Chua et al. 2012; Kirsch 1996; Wiener et al. 2016).  One of the underlying motivations of this 
paper is that research on governance should look more broadly than such a paradigm, e.g., to 
consider institutional effects rather than just economically rational effects (Jacobson 2009).               
 As one final clarification, we note that we view governance as an activity (i.e., 
governance-in-action) (Fox and Ward 2008), rather than as a static structure.  That is, our 
view of governance implies that governance is enacted by senior organizational actors as they 
lead the project, as they structure and restructure it, and as they make high-level project 
decisions.  This is consistent with recommendations in the IS literature (e.g., Jacobson 2009).   
 Having defined governance, we turn to alignment.  Alignment is also defined in 
various ways (Gerow et al. 2014; Gerow et al. 2015; Reich and Benbasat 2000).  The most 
widely-cited definition stems from Henderson and Venkatramen’s (1989) strategic alignment 
model (SAM), which depicts alignment in terms of relationships among four domains: 1) 
business strategy, 2) IT strategy, 3) business infrastructure and processes, and 4) IT 
infrastructure and processes.  Based on these four domains, it defines six types of alignment: 
intellectual alignment (between business- and IT-strategy), operational alignment (between 
business- and IT- infrastructure and processes), business alignment (between business 
strategy and business infrastructure and processes), IT alignment (between IT strategy and IT 
infrastructure and processes), and two types of cross-domain alignment (between business 
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strategy and IT infrastructure and processes, and between IT strategy and business 
infrastructure and processes).  Of these types, we are particularly interested in intellectual and 
operational alignment because IS projects seek to align IS investments with organizational 
goals.  Thus, business alignment and IT alignment alone are not the focus.  Past research 
indicates that more mature governance is associated with greater alignment (De Haes and 
Grembergen 2009), but it remains to be theorized how this activity occurs.  In doing so, a 
process perspective is critical, and long called for (Chan and Reich 2007; Karpovsky and 
Galliers 2015; Schlosser et al. 2015; Vessey and Ward 2013; Wagner et al. 2014).                  
 The final concept in our model is performance.  We view performance as 
synonymous with project success, i.e., the achievement of objective and subjective success 
criteria at the end of a project (Joslin and Muller 2016).  Rather than viewing performance 
purely in terms of the ‘iron triangle’ components (on-time, on-spec, on-budget), we follow the 
literature in taking a broader perspective to consider the full range of intended and unintended 
impacts deemed relevant by stakeholders involved (Jugdev and Muller 2005; Nelson 2005).  
As would be expected of an institutional theory study, we assume that perceived and actual 
benefits can differ (Neves et al. 2016) and that different stakeholders may view benefits and 
success differently (Davis 2014).  We also recognize that performance can be hard (even 
impossible) to judge in complex and uncertain projects, e.g., when there is a lack of clarity in 
the project objectives and scope and when the project will not reach completion for many 
years (Atkinson et al. 2006; Bakhshi et al. 2016).  Likewise, we recognize that the links 
between governance (and indeed, any antecedent) and performance are hard to assess (March 
and Sutton 1997).  We also agree with those who argue that performance, as a construct, may 
be too abstract and that it could be better to theorize specific aspects of performance of 
interest in a given study (Miller et al. 2013).  Our theorizing is not sufficiently advanced, at 
this stage, to pre-specify the particular aspects of performance of interest.  Rather, we simply 
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assume that complex IS projects are undertaken to achieve goals of relevant stakeholders and 
that governance is undertaken to increase the likelihood of attaining these goals.      
2.2  Context 
 Even though IS projects always carry some level of complexity and risk, some 
projects are particularly complex because of their scale, scope, novelty, and consequences.  
Because complexity can arise in many ways (Atkinson et al. 2006; Bakhshi et al. 2016), we 
provide an illustrative context to focus our account.  As Figure 1 shows, the context we 
examine is governmental projects that follow a hub-spoke model in which multiple entities 
operate under a department’s influence.  Other contexts could also be studied (e.g., single-site, 
private sector cases), but hub-spoke models are common in many industries, e.g., regional 
development (Narayan 2007), road transportation (Klaas-Wissing and Albers 2010), air 
transportation (Darabi et al. 2013), healthcare (Yeow and Faraj 2011), and enterprise 
application software development (Huber et al. 2010), amongst others.  In governmental 
contexts, such hub-spoke models are associated with major contemporary questions of public 
policy, i.e., the extent to which government services should be decentralized/devolved to the 
spokes (Dommett and Flinders 2014; Lægreid and Verhoest 2010).   
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Illustrative Complex Project Context 
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 In hub-spoke models, complexity arises due to the (1) number of entities, (2) 
differences among entities, (3) autonomy of the entities, (4) pressures facing the department 
and entities, and (5) nature of the IS project (e.g., the planned degree of integration across 
entities).  For the purpose of the account we provide, therefore, we assume that we are 
studying a context in which there are a large number of entities having diverse interests and 
capabilities, where the entities have some (but not complete) autonomy from a central 
Government department, where all the parties are subjected to a range of pressures (as per 
Figure 1), and where the aim is to implement an integrated system across the entities for the 
benefit of the citizens of the region served by the Government. 
2.3  Institutional theory 
 According to Thornton et al. (2012), institutional theory is best thought of not as a 
single static theory, but as an ongoing theoretical program with certain theoretical orienting 
strategies.  Table 1 summarizes key ideas in the theory over time.      
 
Table 1: Key Ideas in the Institutional Theory Research Program 
Reference  Key Ideas 
(Meyer and 
Rowan 1977)  
 
To  survive  in  an  institutional  field,  organizations  must  conduct  practices  that  are 
legitimate  in  that  field.    Such  practices  may  differ  from  those  the  organization  must 
perform to fulfil its technical mission.  Thus, organizational success depends on decoupling 
the two sets of practices, so that both are performed without hindering each other.      
(DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983)  
 
Organizations achieve  legitimacy by adopting  similar  structures  to other organizations  in 
their  institutional  field.    Rather  than  being  economically  rational,  this  decision  is 
rationalized,  and  is  driven  by  power  (coercive  force),  professional  values  (normative 
force), and by the tendency to copy others in situations of uncertainty (mimetic force).   
(DiMaggio 1988)  
 
While  institutional theory can explain organizational homogeneity, it cannot explain how, 
once  homogeneity  is  achieved,  subsequent  change  occurs.    Researchers  can  do  so  by 
bringing in concepts such as agency, interests, and institutional entrepreneurship. 
(DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991)  
 
Institutional  theory  does  not  sufficiently  address  culture  or  cognition.    Researchers 
studying  institutional  (now  neoinstitutional)  theory  should  do  so  by  considering  culture 
and cognition, especially ‘mindless’ cognition, such as unconscious scripts and habits.   
(Friedland and 
Alford 1991)   
 
To explain  the  links between action and  structure  in organizations,  researchers need  to 
understand how actors’  interests are  institutionally shaped.    Institutions also operate at 
multiple levels of analysis (individual, organization, society) and the contents of them can 
conflict, creating opportunities for actors to manipulate the conflict for their interests.   
(Scott 1995)  
 
Institutional pillars are the elements that support organizational continuity and constraint 
(e.g.,  regulations,  norms,  and  culture  and  cognition).    Institutional  carriers  are  the 
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repositories  in  which  institutions  are  embedded,  such  as  symbolic  systems  (e.g.,  laws, 
schema), relational systems (e.g., governance system), routines, and artifacts.   
(Greenwood et 
al. 2010) 
An  organization’s  environment  exhibits  institutional  complexity  if  the  organization  is 
subject  to  simultaneous  pressures  from  multiple  institutional  logics.    An  organization’s 
actions can sometimes be explained in terms of its attempts to deal with this complexity.     
(Lawrence et al. 
2011)  
 
Institutional work  refers  to  the  practices  of  individuals  and  collective  actors  to  create, 
maintain, or disrupt institutions.  Studying institutional work can give researchers a deeper 
understanding of the nature of institutions and how they have their effects.     
(Thornton et al. 
2012)  
 
An  institutional  logic  refers  to  socially  constructed  symbols  and  practices  (“including 
assumptions, value, and beliefs” p. 2) by which actors engage  in sense‐making, organize 
activities, and reproduce activities.  Researchers studying institutional logics examine how 
individuals, organizations, and societies are constrained and enabled by the diverse sets of 
institutional logics that influence them and how these logics are in turn shaped over time.   
   
As Table 1 indicates, institutional theory has evolved from explaining a limited set of 
outcomes (organizational homogeneity) by a simple mechanism (actors’ efforts to maintain 
legitimacy in the face of common institutional forces) to a much wider set of outcomes (the 
full range of effects of actors’ responses to institutional contexts) by a more complex 
mechanism (the full structurational process through which logics affect actions, and are 
recreated by actions, in complex fields).  In a sense, the theory has grown from a simple 
theory to a rich ontology.  While it began as an attempt by sociologists to explain phenomena 
outside the boundaries of economic theory (as economic theory could not explain non-rational 
behaviour), its boundaries now overlap with and arguably extend beyond economic theory (as 
economic rationality is just one institutional logic that may affect actors in a particular 
context).  Over time, it has evolved from a niche sociological theory to become arguably the 
dominant paradigm in organizational theory (Thornton et al. 2012).   
IS researchers have used institutional theory for some time, e.g., to explain the 
adoption of practices due to the top-down effects of institutional forces (Ang and Cummings 
1997; Chatterjee et al. 2002; Liang et al. 2007; Sia and Soh 2007).  However, detailed 
theoretical investigations are rare (for an exception, see Gosain 2004) and many studies have 
used the older, narrower ideas in institutional theory rather than accounting for its newer ideas 
(Currie and Swanson 2009; Mignerat and Rivard 2009).  An emerging body of work has 
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shown (or recommended) the potential of taking advantage of these recent ideas to explain 
complex institutional phenomena in IS settings (Baroody and Hansen 2012; Berente and Yoo 
2012; Nielsen et al. 2014; Yeow and Faraj 2011).  The aim of the next section is to follow this 
lead to provide an institutional theory account of the potential links between governance, 
alignment, and performance in the context of a complex IS project.        
3.  Theory 
 With reference to Figure 1, the starting assumption of the theory is that an integrated 
system is being implemented across the spokes (sites) of a hub-spoke model.  Much like 
Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999) predicted that different factors would lead organizations to 
adopt centralized, decentralized, or mixed (federated) governance at a point in time, the 
theory we develop suggests that initial starting conditions as well as states that emerge over 
time will lead a complex hub-spoke project to move from a more centralized model to a more 
decentralized model and back again.  The theory has three sets of propositions.  The first set 
of propositions concerns the initial governance of the project by the hub and the problems that 
could lead it to lose control.  The second set of propositions concerns the effects that could 
arise as power shifts to one of the spokes.  The third set of propositions concerns our 
prediction that governance will later move back to the hub.  To explain changes over time, the 
propositions involve a mix of process and variance elements (Burton-Jones et al. 2015).  
Table 2 summarizes the basic logic, which we discuss in detail in the following sections.   
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Table 2: Summary of the Propositions 
Project element and actor  Process over time  
Project approach/ stage  Starting point; 
common rollout  
Trying to progress common 
rollout 
 
Change to sequential rollout with lead spoke 
first (P6) 
After go‐live at lead spoke 
Actors’ 
experiences 
and 
perceptions… 
…hub  Project governance 
lies with hub (P1) 
  Loss of power 
(P3) 
Social influence 
tactics (P5); 
overinvest in lead 
spoke (P7). 
  Project 
governance 
reverts back to 
hub (P11) 
Greater 
governance 
complexity and 
frustration with 
progress (P13).   
…lead 
spoke 
    Gain of power 
(P3) 
Despite change in 
power, old 
governance practices 
remain (P4).  
Appreciate support 
from hub but critique 
its influence (P5, P7).   
Focus on their interests 
rather than other 
spokes and the hub, and 
focus on operations 
over strategy (P8).   Key 
individuals work outside 
formal structure (P10)
Tensions between 
maintenance of 
system at lead 
spoke and 
implementations 
at other spokes 
(P11)
Experience 
frustration due to 
overlapping parts 
(maintenance and 
implementation) 
(P13)   
… other  
spokes  
        Less influence than 
earlier; role changes (P 9)
As above (P11).  
Also, gaming 
behaviour due to 
visibility of effects 
at lead spoke (P12) 
Experience 
frustration (as 
above) (P13).  
… external  
stakeholders 
Government 
supports initial 
model  
  Government 
changes 
governance (P3)
    Government 
reconsiders 
governance (P13) 
Government 
reconsiders 
funding (P14) 
Outcomes (alignment and 
performance) 
Too early to assess 
performance 
Observed 
problems; hub 
blamed (P2) 
  Too early to assess 
performance (of 
new model) 
  Challenges to actual 
performance.  Plus 
perceived vs. actual 
performance differ 
due to gaming (P12)
Focus on lead 
spoke’s perceived 
performance; real 
performance 
affected by actors’ 
actions outside 
formal governance 
structure (P14) 
Institutional theory factors 
involved in making 
predictions 
Actors’ interests and 
taken for granted 
assumptions (P1) 
Institutional 
complexity and 
institutional 
logic (P2) 
Actors’ 
interests and 
legitimacy 
seeking (P3) 
Actors’ taken for 
granted assumptions 
(P4) and interests 
and legitimacy 
seeking (P5‐P7)
Actors’ legitimacy 
seeking, rationalizing, 
and decoupling (P8, P9).  
Contradictions, norms, 
and mobilization (P10).
Actors’ interests, 
taken for granted 
assumptions, and 
institutional 
responses (P11)
Actors’ legitimacy‐
seeking, interests, 
and mobilization 
(P14) 
* P = Proposition 
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3.1  First stage - Hub control 
 In a hub-spoke model, where a central Government department is the hub and the 
entities are the spokes, the implementation of an integrated system across the entities (in 
contrast to having unintegrated or disparate systems) can offer substantial benefits such as the 
ability to share transaction data among entities (e.g., when serving common customers) and to 
learn from data aggregated across the entities (e.g., for benchmarking).  From an institutional 
perspective, we expect if a decision has been made to implement an integrated system across 
the spokes, project governance will initially be led by the hub (rather than the spokes).  This is 
partly due to taken-for-granted assumptions and partly due to the agents’ interests. 
In terms of taken-for-granted assumptions, hub-spoke architectures in Government 
tend to be established based on the view that the hub is the party concerned with the common 
interests of the spokes and its role is to provide resources to support these common interests, 
whereas the spokes are established to concern themselves with the interests of their local 
activities and customers (Lægreid and Verhoest 2010).   We therefore expect that it would be 
natural (i.e., taken-for-granted) if the hub rather than any individual spoke led the IS project.   
  In terms of agents’ interests, the hub is likely to have additional reasons for wanting to 
govern the project.  This is because even though all the parties can benefit from accessing 
aggregated data, the benefits are greater for organizations that have to make decisions based 
on more standardized (rather than local) data, which is naturally more the case at the level of 
the hub than the spokes (Goodhue et al. 1992).  Having access to aggregated, standardized 
data also provide opportunities for the hub to exercise greater control over the spokes, so we 
expect it would have a desire to control the governance of the project too (Orlikowski 1991).   
Proposition 1:  If an integrated system is being implemented across the entities (spokes) in a 
hub-spoke model, the governance of the project will initially lie with the hub.  
 
Even though we expect the governance of the project to be initially led by the hub, we 
expect the hub to have difficulty managing such a project due to institutional complexity.  
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Institutional complexity rises in this context if there are numerous, diverse spokes.  As the 
number of spokes increase, logistical difficulties are likely to increase.  For instance, delays 
are likely simply because of the time required to gain consensus amongst the large number of 
stakeholders involved.  Likewise, the greater the diversity of the spokes, the more substantive 
difficulties we would expect in understanding, integrating, and meeting users’ diverse 
requirements.  These complexities arise regardless of the type of implementation.  In the case 
of bespoke systems, these complexities impair the ability to design a system that fits users’ 
work-processes; in the case of package implementations, the complexities impair the ability to 
configure the system appropriately for each site and to enact sufficient changes in work 
processes at each spoke (site) to fit to the new system.   
Institutional complexity rises further if the balance of power in the institutional field is 
not in the hub’s favour.  This can occur if the prevailing political view (i.e., institutional 
logic) is that decentralization or devolution of power from a hub to its spokes is desirable, 
which has been a prevailing view in many liberal democracies recently (Dommett and 
Flinders 2014).  While prevailing logics change over time (e.g., from centralization to 
decentralization and back again), such changes tend to occur in a wave-like or punctuated 
equilibrium manner because institutions tend to resist change (especially a loss of power) and, 
thus, external forces such as changes in government are often required to precipitate them 
(Dommett and Flinders 2014; Modell 2004).  If a complex IS project is being governed by a 
hub in a context in which the spokes have greater power, we expect the hub is likely to have 
difficulty governing the project because it would have difficulty motivating the spokes to 
engage in activities that are in the collective’s interest but not in their own (e.g., participating 
in requirements gathering and agreeing to local work-process changes).   
For all of the above reasons, we expect that as institutional complexity increases 
during the project’s initial stages, the hub will experience greater difficulties governing the IS 
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project.  In line with broader findings in the IS literature, we predict that these challenges 
would then lead to observed problems (e.g., delays, budget overruns) (Nah and Lau 2001) 
which would then be attributed back to the hub due to its leadership role.  Ceteris paribus, we 
would expect these problems to be self-reinforcing, i.e., challenges and problems lead to 
greater complexity, leading to more challenges and problems.  In line with institutional 
theory, we predict that the rising awareness of problems would then lead to questions over the 
appropriate governance of the project going forward (Seo and Creed 2002).           
Proposition 2:  During the initial stages of the project in which the hub is in control of 
governance, the presence of institutional complexity will lead to: (a) ongoing 
challenges for the hub, (b) observed problems (such as delays or budget 
overruns), (c) attribution of failure by stakeholders in the institutional field to 
the hub’s governance, and (d) questions over whether/how to change the 
governance of the project going forward.   
 
Following from Proposition 2, we expect the Government to have to answer questions 
about how to proceed.  Traditionally, there are two options (Pan et al. 2006): terminate the 
project or redirect/restructure it.  Assuming the decision is to redirect/restructure it, we see 
two options in a hub-spoke context: (1) substitution:  control over governance remains with 
the hub but the hub’s responsibilities are outsourced, e.g., to a consulting firm or vendor, or 
(2) inversion:  control over governance changes so that one or more of the spokes take greater 
responsibility and the hub takes more of a support role.  Rather than having a universal 
preference for one or other option, institutional theory would predict that the choice would be 
driven by whichever strategy enhanced perceptions of the Government’s legitimacy in its 
institutional field.  Given that multi-site IT projects require significant resources (and given 
that such projects in governmental contexts are often subject to severe financial constraints, 
Rubin 2010), we predict that the choice is likely to be a ‘high stakes’ decision in that context, 
and given that the decision is triggered by problems/challenges, it is also likely to be 
influenced by a risk-reduction, loss-minimization frame (Fleischmann et al. 2014).  That is, 
which option reduces the risk of the Government appearing to have mis-managed the project?   
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Ultimately, the choice could go either way, and we could use institutional theory to 
predict the subsequent trajectory of events under either option.  However, for the purpose of 
this paper, we assume that the choice is made to take the second option (inversion).  We 
expect this choice is more likely if two conditions are in place.  First, it is likely if there is a 
power- and competence-hierarchy amongst the spokes, such that one of the spokes is a natural 
leader amongst the other spokes.  In this case, institutional theory would predict that: (1) the 
leading spoke would have an interest in having greater control over the project, and (2) 
devolving power to the lead spoke could be perceived as legitimate in the institutional field 
due to that spoke’s interest and competence.   
Second, the choice of an inversion strategy is likely if the prevailing sentiment in the 
institutional field is that outsourcing is particularly risky or costly.  Even though outsourcing 
is never universally better or worse – the benefits and costs depend on the context (Lee et al. 
2004) – if there have been recent failures or scandals due to outsourcing in that institutional 
field (as can occur, e.g., Barney et al. 2009), we predict decision-makers would be inclined 
against outsourcing, particularly given that we expect them to use a risk-reduction, loss 
minimization frame of reference (Fleischmann et al. 2014).  If the prevailing sentiment 
against outsourcing is negative or cautious, outsourcing providers would also be cautious 
about taking the role (and would price this uncertainty into their proposals) because of the 
risks they may be forced to bear (Dad Aundhe and Matthew 2009), further reducing the 
likelihood of the Government choosing the outsourcing strategy. 
Proposition 3: If the Government considers restructuring the multi-site project in response to 
ongoing problems/challenge, it will choose an inversion strategy (devolving 
power to one of the spokes) if there is a natural leader amongst the spokes 
and if the prevailing sentiment in the institutional field is cautious of 
outsourcing.  
 
3.2  Second stage - Spoke control 
In this section, we provide an institutional theory account of the possible trajectory of 
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events once the lead-spoke takes control.  We begin by noting that although Proposition 3 
predicts a formal shift in power from the hub to a spoke, institutional theory would predict 
that the actual shift is likely to be affected by path dependence and agents’ interests.   
In terms of path dependence, there is likely to be a significant degree of continuity in 
project governance.  We referred earlier to three dimensions of governance: leadership, 
structure, and decision-making processes (Bowen et al. 2007; ITGI 2007).  Even if leadership 
devolves to the lead spoke, substantial continuity is likely in governance structures and 
decision-making processes.  For instance, we expect the committee structures of the project to 
remain fairly similar and the method for raising information to the committees and using that 
information to make decisions to remain fairly similar (other than the lead spoke having more 
influence).  We make these predictions because we expect that when the hub led the project, it 
would have instituted structures and methods that were generally taken-for-granted in that 
institutional field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  We also expect the lead spoke’s criticisms of 
the hub’s governance to relate to the hub’s lack of knowledge of the spokes’ business (a 
traditional criticism of central agencies, Lægreid and Verhoest 2010) rather than due to its 
lack of knowledge of best practices in project management and governance.   
Proposition 4:  After the shift in governance from control by the hub to control by a lead-
spoke, there will be a significant change in project leadership (with greater 
control by the lead-spoke) but less change in formal governance structures or 
decision-making processes.   
 
In terms of agents’ interests, we expect each actor (hub, lead spoke, other spokes) to 
negotiate and act in their own interests.  We discuss each one in turn.  First, regarding the 
hub, we expect key actors in the hub who previously had power over areas of the project and 
whose power is now devolved to the lead spoke will continue to exert influence beyond their 
formal (revised) responsibilities.  We expect this because the reputation of all key individuals 
involved will be tainted if the project fails.  Institutional theory stresses that actors seek to 
maintain legitimacy in their institutional field (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).  Given the 
17 
 
reputational risk that could stem from failure, we expect individuals at the hub to be highly 
motivated to ensure the project’s success despite lacking formal power.  We expect their 
actions to involve a range of influence tactics (Sabherwal and Grover 2010), from 
contributing or withholding information to participating in and influencing decisions.  We 
expect these actors to view their actions to be in the interests of the project.  However, we 
expect members of the lead-spoke to view such actions as meddling and to trigger concerns 
about a lack of clarity in the governance structures and processes.  
Proposition 5:  After the shift in governance from control by the hub to control by a lead-
spoke, key individuals in the hub will continue to exert influence beyond that 
expected by their role.  They will view their attempts positively, but members 
at the site will have a less-positive perception and will claim that it impairs 
project governance.  
   
In terms of the lead spoke’s interest, we expect that when negotiating to take greater 
control over the project, the lead-spoke will emphasize its short-term interests over both its 
long-term interests and the interests of other parties (hub and spokes).  We expect this to 
occur in several ways.  First, if the project has not already adopted a sequential rollout, we 
expect the lead-spoke to recommend a sequential rollout across spokes, with the lead site 
going first, rather than a simultaneous rollout across spokes.  This is in its short-term and 
long-term interest because it will increase the chance of a successful implementation.  A 
sequential strategy ensures that it will receive the full attention of relevant parties (e.g., hub, 
consultants, vendor) for a period, and being first in the sequence ensures that it has greater 
control over configuration decisions and more-guaranteed funding (as funding is likely to be 
increasingly insecure over time due to changes in political cycles) (Rubin 2010).  However, 
from a legitimacy-seeking perspective, we expect the lead-spoke to make concessions in its 
negotiation that are not in its long-term interests.  In particular, we expect it to agree to an 
aggressive implementation time-table.  This is for two reasons.  First, we expect them, like 
most other organizations, to underestimate the work required (Akkermans and Helden 2002; 
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Umble et al. 2003).  Second, given their leadership role amongst the spokes and their 
criticisms of the hub’s progress, asking for a longer-than-expected time frame could be 
interpreted by others in the institutional field as an indication that they lack confidence or 
competence, i.e., a loss of face (Plate 2015).  In short, we expect senior executives at the lead 
spoke to adopt a “we’ll show them” mentality and agree to a tighter than desirable time-table.   
Proposition 6:  After the shift in governance from control by the hub to control by a lead-
spoke, the lead-spoke will negotiate for a sequential rollout approach with it 
being the first implementation site with an aggressive implementation 
timeframe.  
   
Agreeing to an aggressive time-line will have a number of consequences for the hub, 
lead-spoke, and other stakeholders.  In terms of consequences for the hub, we expect the hub 
will invest substantial resources (time, talent, effort) in the lead-spoke’s implementation, even 
more than required.  This is because the Government’s support (and funding) for the ongoing 
rollout is likely to depend on success in the first (and subsequent) implementations.  Even if 
an initial failure could be overcome (Akkermans and Helden 2002), failure would still cost 
the hub (and lead-spoke) financially and harm their reputation.  We expect that the resources 
invested by the hub in the lead-spoke’s implementation will, in general, be beneficial, because 
it will provide the lead-spoke with greater resources.  However, we expect this could also 
cause problems for the hub in the long-term because they may over-invest in the lead-spoke, 
leaving fewer resources for subsequent spokes.  We also expect the heavy involvement of the 
hub in the lead-spoke’s implementation will lead to ongoing claims at the lead-spoke about 
the lack of clarity regarding the hub’s role in the project. 
Proposition 7:  After the shift in governance from control by the hub to control by a lead-
spoke, the hub will invest more resources in the lead-spoke’s implementation 
than formally required.  This will lead to: (a) appreciation from the lead-
spoke for the resources, (b) claims by the lead-spoke that the hub’s 
involvement reduces the clarity of project governance, and (c) a shortage of 
resources later for the hub and other spokes.     
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In terms of consequences for the lead-spoke, we expect it to take several steps to 
implement the system within the aggressive timeline:  
‐ First, we expect it to avoid changes to the system because changing software is known 
to increase risk and take time (Nah and Lau 2001).   
‐ Second, we expect it to allow for optionality in the system’s design.  For instance, 
front-line users may be required to enter data into forms as part of their work.  Where 
possible, we expect the lead-spoke to allow forms (or fields within forms) to be 
optional rather than mandatory (from the user’s perspective), to make the system less 
restrictive and thus less likely to incite users’ frustration and resistance (Lapointe and 
Rivard 2005).  Of course, this strategy trades short-term gains for longer-term costs, as 
the system may not contain all of the information the lead-spoke needs or desires later 
(e.g., for aggregate reports).       
‐ Third, we expect the lead-spoke to take shortcuts in requirements gathering and 
validation, testing, and training.  However, to maintain legitimacy, we expect these 
shortcuts will not be evident in official documents.  For instance, assume the hub 
follows a project management methodology in all its projects that requires users to be 
trained on the system before go-live.  In such a case, we predict the lead-spoke would 
carry out the training and that the official documents would show this occurred.  
However, if we interviewed users, we predict they would say that the training was 
basic or rushed.  This is just one example but the principle is that we predict the lead-
spoke would take short-cuts while still ‘ticking all the boxes.’  
‐ Fourth, we expect the lead-spoke to focus on operational matters rather than strategic 
matters during system configuration and implementation.  Ideally, executives would 
consider both strategic and operational issues (Henderson and Venkatraman 1993), but 
we expect there to be little time or patience amongst senior project members at the 
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lead-spoke to consider how to design or implement the system to achieve strategic 
objectives.  Rather, we expect them to focus on getting the system in on-time and 
without obvious failure.  We expect other issues to be left to the future, e.g., to a list of 
changes to be made after go-live.     
‐ Fifth, we expect the lead-spoke to focus more on its own interest than the interests of 
the lead-spoke or the hub.  The design of an integrated system requires individual units 
to agree to common ways of working despite knowing that the system will not meet 
some of their individual requirements (Goodhue et al. 1992).  Even so, we expect the 
lead-spoke to make few concessions to other spokes.  Given the lead-spoke’s 
leadership role in the institutional field, we expect it to rationalize this decision based 
on the argument that ‘it knows better’ than other spokes.  That is, in its view, the lead-
spoke leads rather than follows the professional norms in that institutional field 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983).         
Proposition 8:  After the shift in governance from control by the hub to control by a lead-
spoke, the lead-spoke will shift the focus of governance from a focus on 
strategic issues and common interests to getting the system implemented in 
the lead-spoke on-time and without obvious failures.  We expect this shift not 
to be evident in official documents, but to be evident when talking with 
representatives from the lead-spoke, hub, and other spokes.       
 
 In terms of consequences for other stakeholders, we highlight two stakeholders – other 
spokes and key individuals at the lead-spoke – and the institutional responses (Oliver 1991) 
we expect for each one.  In terms of other spokes, we expect a shift in their participation in 
the project from active engagement to passive engagement and lobbying, partly due to their 
loss of control and partly due to a shift in their interests (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Oliver 
1991).  In terms of control, when the hub controlled the project, we expect the hub would 
strive to have a broad representation of spokes in project decision-making (akin to a 
‘federated’ governance structure, Weill and Ross 2004), to align with its institutional role of 
supporting all the spokes and to enable common interests and individual differences to be 
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identified and addressed (Goodhue et al. 1992).  However, when the lead-spoke takes control, 
we expect (as per Proposition 8) that the lead-spoke would shift the focus to its own interest 
and would place professional pressure on other spokes to accept its decisions (Oliver 1991).  
To maintain legitimacy, we would also expect the lead-spoke to decouple its reduction of 
other spokes’ actual influence from formal documentation describing their influence (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977).  For example, official documents (e.g., committee terms of reference and 
formal sign-offs) are likely to continue to show representation from other spokes in the 
project governance.   
We expect the lead-spoke will rationalize (Thornton et al. 2012) any reduction in other 
spokes’ actual influence by arguing that their lesser influence is not because of a lack of 
power but simply because they have less knowledge of the system compared to the lead-
spoke.  Nonetheless, we expect representatives from other spokes will argue that the shift in 
control of the project led to a real reduction in their influence.  We also expect that the focus 
of other spokes will shift from being actively engaged in the details of the project (e.g., 
systems design and implementation) to more of a lobbying role, focusing on their position in 
the sequence of planned rollouts or other similar issues that affect their ability to obtain 
funding before political cycles reduce or remove it (Rubin 2010).           
Proposition 9:  After the shift in governance from control by the hub to control by a lead-
spoke, other spokes will have less influence on the project.  Their focus will 
shift to lobbying relevant parties to ensure they still receive funding for their 
implementations.          
 
While we focused above on the agency of organizations (hub, lead-spoke, other 
spokes), we expect key individuals to have influential roles too (Friedland and Alford 1991; 
Thornton et al. 2012).  In particular, we expect key individuals to notice contradictions 
between their perception of how the project could have aligned with their interests and the 
actuality of the project implementation and to take action to influence the process to align 
more with their own interests (Seo and Creed 2002).  For instance, we expect them to notice 
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that the project is focusing less on issues required for achieving long-term strategic objectives 
(as per Proposition 8), e.g., capturing the data required to answer important business questions 
and having the tools and capabilities to analyze the data appropriately (Chen et al. 2012).   
For two reasons, we expect these individuals to be located at the lead-spoke.  First, we 
expect a selection effect such that, on average, more-powerful and more-capable individuals 
in the institutional field work at the lead-spoke than other spokes.  Second, given our 
expectation that the lead-spoke will focus the implementation on its own site first, we expect 
individuals at the lead-spoke to have more first-hand knowledge of the implementation than 
individuals at other spokes, and thus will be more aware than individuals at other spokes of 
contradictions between the project’s potential and its actuality. While subject to the normative 
pressures of their profession, we expect key individuals at the lead-spoke to be less beholden 
to the normative pressures of a project management methodology or systems development 
approach (Thornton et al. 2012).  Moreover, in line with institutional theory, we predict these 
key individuals will be unlikely to achieve change individually, but will do so by mobilizing 
resources (such as attention and effort) in a bottom-up manner from other individuals inside 
and outside the formal structures (Lawrence et al. 2011; Seo and Creed 2002).  For instance, 
in the case of focusing insufficiently on data capture and data analytics, we would expect key 
individuals in the lead-spoke to create formal or informal working groups to examine the 
issue and influence the system’s implementation to address the issue either before or after go-
live.  In the project team, the actions of these individuals will lead to mixed views (e.g., a mix 
of appreciation of their efforts and a concern that they are distracting attention and resources 
away from the more-important issue of getting the system implemented on time).       
Proposition 10: After the shift in governance from control by the hub to control by a lead-
spoke, key individuals at the lead-spoke will perceive a lack of focus on 
issues they believe are of strategic importance and they will mobilize 
resources (at least partly outside of the formal governance structure) to 
address these issues.          
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3.3  Third stage - Hub control 
After go-live at the lead-spoke, attention will shift to the remaining implementations at 
other spokes.  For several reasons, we expect the lead-spoke to relinquish leadership of the 
project and the hub (rather than other spokes) to retake it.  On the one hand, in an institutional 
field with multiple independent entities (spokes), it would go against professional norms for 
one independent entity (e.g., lead-spoke) to control the implementation of a system at another 
independent entity (e.g., other spokes).  In addition to lacking knowledge of other spokes’ 
detailed work processes, the lead-spoke would lack legitimacy leading a project when it did 
not share the other spokes’ interests.  On this point, while all the spokes have institutional 
reasons to display respect for each other’s interests (because of political sensitivities), 
incentives for actual support differ.  While other spokes had an incentive to support the first 
implementation at the lead-spoke (because failure at the first site in the sequence could 
threaten the funding of future sites), the lead spoke does not have such incentives for others’ 
success (because it already has the system implemented at its site regardless of other sites’ 
success or failure).  Thus, a logical solution after go-live at the lead-spoke is to shift the 
control of the project to the next spoke in the sequence of implementations.   
On the other hand, given the shortcuts taken by the lead-spoke during implementation 
(per Proposition 8), we expect the lead-spoke will have to engage in substantial adaptive 
maintenance after go-live to achieve business-IT alignment (Heales 2002).  Thus, we expect 
that even though it will not have an interest in controlling other spokes’ implementations, we 
expect it will want influence over the division of resources between adaptive maintenance and 
implementation.  Moreover, because changes to the design of an integrated system affect each 
of the sites using it, we also expect the lead-spoke to be resistant to other spokes making 
system changes during their implementations (because such changes could affect its own 
system and further divert attention and resources away from the resources it needs for 
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adaptive maintenance).  For all these reasons, we expect the lead-spoke to be against any 
other spoke taking control.   
The logical solution is for the hub to retake control.  We expect this choice to be 
acceptable to most of the spokes because it is the only actor in the institutional field required 
to consider all of the spokes’ interests.  We also expect this choice to be desirable for the hub, 
as it would allow it to reinstate its assumed leadership role in the institutional field (Dommett 
and Flinders 2014).      
Proposition 11: After go-live at the lead-spoke, control over governance will shift back from 
the lead-spoke to the hub.  Tensions will be evident between requests for 
resources for adaptive maintenance at the lead-spoke and implementations at 
subsequent spokes.            
 
The implementation of any information system is subject to uncertainty (Weick 1990).  
Thus, the go-live at the lead-spoke offers opportunities for all the actors in an institutional 
field to learn from the implementation and make sense of it in light of their own interests 
(Daft and Weick 1984).  In a hub-spoke model, we especially expect spokes to take an interest 
in the impact of the system on their performance metrics vis-à-vis those of other spokes.  In 
the public sector, within-group differences in performance can have major implications for 
funding and reputation in the field (Modell 2004).  As noted earlier, the design of any 
integrated system requires each party to accept a less-than-optimal system for its own needs to 
obtain benefits that can emerge from a focus on common interests (Goodhue et al. 1992).  We 
also noted earlier that the lead-spoke is likely to have designed the system to align with its 
interests (possibly against interests of other spokes).  However, due to the uncertainty of 
system design (Weick 1990), we expect that some of its decisions will have unintentionally 
been against its interest, e.g., reducing its actual or perceived performance.  We expect these 
consequences to result in gaming behaviour amongst the various spokes (Oliver 1991).  That 
is, we expect subsequent spokes to request changes to the system that will allow them to 
increase their actual or perceived performance relative to the lead spoke, and we would also 
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expect them to resist implementing parts of the system that would reduce their perceived or 
actual performance relative to the lead-spoke.  We would also expect the lead spoke to engage 
in efforts to counter other spokes’ efforts in these regards, and we expect these gaming efforts 
will consume substantial resources from the hub and all of the spokes.    
Proposition 12: After go-live at the lead-spoke, the effect of the system on the lead spoke’s 
performance will start to emerge.  The visibility of this information will lead 
to attempts by all the spokes to game the subsequent implementations and 
adaptive maintenance to optimise the system for their own actual or perceived 
performance vis-à-vis other spokes.  This will consume substantial attention 
by all the parties.                
 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the governance of the project will become 
increasingly complex and problematic over time even though the Government’s original 
intention for shifting control from the hub to the lead-spoke was to reduce complexity and the 
problems it causes.  In particular, we expect the net effect of the decision to shift control from 
the hub to the lead-spoke is that the lead-spoke will have a more successful implementation at 
its own site than it otherwise would have experienced, but that the project will subsequently 
be saddled with tensions between implementations and adaptive maintenance, gaming 
behaviour among spokes, and a lack of resources due to overinvesting in the implementation 
at the lead-spoke.  As in Stage 1, we expect these complexities and problems will become 
self-reinforcing because effort and attention will be required to address them, reducing effort 
and attention available for implementations at each spoke.  Accordingly, we expect the 
growing awareness of challenges will lead the Government to consider further changes in the 
project’s governance.   
Proposition 13: After go-live at the lead-spoke, the lead-spoke, hub, and other spokes, will 
express growing frustration with governance.  Over time, these tensions will 
lead to a growing set of problems that will trigger the Government to 
reconsider the project’s governance.  
 
However, we expect the Government will need to consider different solutions to those 
in Stage 1.  Specifically, we do not expect that outsourcing would be seen to be a legitimate 
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solution.  We expect that if the Government agreed to outsource the project, it would risk 
losing face in the institutional field, as the decision could be interpreted as an admission that it 
should have chosen outsourcing originally.  We also do not expect that control could be 
devolved to any other spoke.  Other spokes would not have the same institutional legitimacy 
as the lead-spoke and the lead-spoke would likely be against other spokes taking control.   
We expect two other options would be more legitimate.  One option would be to try to 
tackle the root causes of the problems.  This would likely require increasing the funding 
allocated to the project (to address the consequences that stemmed from originally agreeing to 
an overly ambitious timeframe) and reducing emphasis on between-spoke comparisons in the 
institutional field (to reduce gaming behavior among spokes).  A second option would be to 
cancel the project (Pan et al. 2006).  This second option could be perceived to be legitimate if 
the Government could frame the decision to align with its prior rhetoric (Heracleous and 
Barrett 2001), e.g., if it could claim that it is not really cancelling the project, but just 
deferring the implementation of the system at future spokes while it learns from the current 
implementations.   
From the perspective of maintaining institutional reputation, we expect the hub and all 
the spokes would be in favour of the first option (addressing the root cause).  However, given 
that this option would require increased funding, its choice would depend on the relevant 
funding cycles and the sentiment towards the project in the institutional field at that time 
(Rubin 2010).  This sentiment would be determined by the sum of negative and positive news 
regarding the project.  We expect decision-makers would focus especially on the effects of the 
implementation at the lead-spoke.  From the perspective of negative news, it is possible that 
the lead-spoke could show a relatively unproblematic implementation.  However, for the 
reasons outlined earlier (see Proposition 8), we expect it would be difficult for the lead-spoke 
to show substantial evidence of positive news, e.g., in terms of achieving strategic benefits.  
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We believe its ability to do so would depend on the success of the efforts of those key 
individuals at the lead spoke (see Proposition 10) who acted in an unsanctioned manner to 
pursue their own interests and mobilize others to achieve more-strategic objectives.    
Proposition 14: At some point after go-live at the lead-spoke, the hub and spokes will need to 
lobby for more funding for future implementations.  Their success will 
depend on the ability of the lead spoke to show a lack of negative effects 
from implementation coupled with the ability of key individuals at the lead-
spoke to have demonstrated (possibly in an unsanctioned manner) strategic 
benefits from the implementation.  
 
4.  Discussion 
In this paper, we have provided an account of the relationships between governance, 
alignment, and performance in the context of a complex IS project.  Our arguments combine 
an interest in processes (in the movement among stages) as well as variables (in the factors 
that affect outcomes in each stage); we believe such a combined perspective is necessary to 
account for the dynamic context our theory attempts to shed light on (Burton-Jones et al. 
2015).  In keeping with an institutional perspective, our account reveals that concepts such as 
alignment and performance are institutionally complex.  Different actors in an institutional 
field could have legitimately different views regarding what alignment means, what goal they 
are aligning to, and what performance objectives they are required to meet.  Our account also 
reveals how important it would be in an empirical investigation of the theory to conduct in-
depth studies (Cicmil et al. 2006; Pollack 2007) – to account not just for ‘official’ recordings 
of governance (e.g., official sign-offs and written governance structures) but also the actual 
enactment of both formal governance (e.g., how things actually occur in formal meetings) and 
informal governance (e.g., how key individuals mobilize resources outside formal structures).     
The importance of having a better understanding of the links between governance, 
alignment, and performance, is well accepted (Joslin and Muller 2016; Liang et al. 2011).  So 
too is the importance of considering the issues from a social theory perspective in contrast to 
more-prevalent approaches in the past, such as taking an economically-rational perspective or 
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taking an atheoretic approach (Jacobson 2009; Westphal and Zajac 2013).  To give one 
example, the IS field has learned a great deal from knowledge-based perspectives on 
governance that show how governance structures and outcomes can be explained by broad 
differences in knowledge between different actors in a project team (e.g., knowledge of 
applications versus knowledge of infrastructure) (Tiwana 2009; Tiwana and Kim 2015).  
Although the knowledge-based perspective has proven useful, it implicitly assumes that 
decision-making rights, and the knowledge required to make the decisions, are clear.  What if 
they are uncertain and contested?  The knowledge-based perspective is less likely to apply in 
such cases.  However, uncertainties and dialectics are prevalent in reality (Benbya and 
McKelvey 2006; Mitchell 2009) and the presence of persistent uncertainties could potentially 
explain why so many large projects spiral into difficulties (Flyvbjerg et al. 2009; Nelson 
2005).  In such cases, we expect that institutional accounts such as the one offered here are 
likely to be valuable.   
The account that we offer has been tailored to a specific type of context.  A limitation 
of this approach is that our account cannot apply to all complex contexts.  We tried to find a 
mid-level of abstraction rather than choosing a context that is too narrow or too all-
encompassing.  It is difficult to pick the right level of abstraction but we hope that by clearly 
describing the context we chose, researchers and practitioners interested in this context will 
gain insights from the account we offer (Johns 2006; Ramiller and Pentland 2009).  For 
practitioners, we also hope our theoretical account offers insights that complement and go 
beyond the atheoretic account that is more common in practice (e.g., using industry standards 
and maturity models) (Orozco et al. 2015; Simonsson et al. 2010).   
In addition to focusing on one context, our account is limited in several other ways.  
For instance, we only examined a subset of actors relevant in this context.  In particular, we 
gave scant attention to vendors and consultants other than examining whether control of the 
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project would be outsourced to them.  In reality, even if control is not outsourced to a 
consultant or vendor, they can still have a major influence on the project and its governance.  
A full account would consider their role in more depth (Liu and Yuliani 2016).  Likewise, we 
also only considered a subset of the possibilities that could transpire in this context.  A full 
account would examine other possibilities (e.g., what events would transpire if the project 
was outsourced at the end of Stage 1? What events would transpire if the project was 
cancelled at the end of Stage 3?).  Another limitation is that we only used a limited set of 
ideas from institutional theory.  If we had drawn on more of the theory’s ideas, we could have 
shown the power of the theory more strongly. For instance, concepts such as theorization 
could be used to understand how different stakeholders make sense, and give sense to others, 
regarding the nature of the system being implemented and how best to govern it (Nielsen et 
al. 2014).  We also artificially limit our account by looking at institutional theory alone.  
Institutional theory can be used together with several other social theories (such as practice 
theory, amongst others) (Thornton et al. 2012) and it would be valuable to combine or 
contrast the insights we offer here with other such theories (Floricel et al. 2014).  Finally, we 
did not discuss how the theory might be tested.  Such a test would require a longitudinal 
design over enough time to allow for the purported processes to occur (or not).  It is likely 
that a grounded theory study could be particularly useful because researchers could start with 
the theoretical ideas discussed here but extend them through close-up observations in the field 
and analysis of field data.     
5.  Conclusion 
Motivated by the opportunity to improve accounts of the links between governance, 
alignment, and performance, we have offered a theory to explain their interrelationships in the 
context of a complex IS project.  In addition to its specific predictions, the theory we 
developed reveals three overall insights.  First, governance, alignment, and performance are 
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all socially constructed and change and evolve over time.  Second, seemingly rational 
attempts to improve governance, alignment, and performance can end up, unintentionally, 
impairing each of them.  Third, the performance outcomes that are influential in an 
institutional field are likely to be those wrought by the actions of key individuals operating in 
spite of, and outside of, formal governance structures.  Despite acknowledged limitations, we 
believe the account we offer provides useful insights for researchers and practitioners working 
on complex IS projects.   
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